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Demystifying emergence
D AV I D  yAT e S
Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa
Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to 
explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal 
explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist world-
view require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also 
physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that 
they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has 
it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, 
we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which 
such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this 
paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized prop-
erties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my 
proposal is to reject causal- functional accounts of realization and embrace a broad-
er account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional 
properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non- causal specifications, so 
realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for 
causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O— a 
qualitative, multiply realizable property— plays an irreducible role in explaining its 
dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science 
properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong 
emergence, without any of the mystery.
According to the layered model, our world is naturally divided into a hier-  archy of levels, with basic physics at the bottom. Although higher- level 
properties and particulars are ultimately dependent upon and determined by 
basic physics, they are the subject matter of autonomous sciences. What does 
the autonomy of the so- called special sciences— chemistry, biology, neuroscience, 
psychology— consist in? According to a longstanding tradition, special science 
autonomy requires that the relevant higher- level properties feature in laws that 
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provide genuine causal explanations that are not available from a purely basic 
physical perspective (Fodor 1997: 149– 150). Assuming that in general, properties 
are causally relevant by dint of the causal powers they bestow, the most obvi-
ous way for special sciences to secure autonomy is for dependent special science 
properties to bestow novel causal powers relative to the basic physical proper-
ties upon which they depend. However, the demands of a broadly physicalist 
worldview require that these properties are not only dependent on basic phys-
ics, but also in some appropriate sense physically realized (Horgan 1993; Wilson 
1999; 2015). Because realized properties are derivative, and in some sense noth-
ing over and above their realizers, it’s notoriously difficult to see how they could 
bestow causal powers that their realizers do not, whence a dilemma: it seems 
we must either give up autonomy, and with it the layered model; or give up 
physicalism, and replace physical realization with a mysterious emergence that 
allows dependent properties to bestow novel powers.
This dilemma is at the heart of the Fodor- Kim debate on the special sciences 
(Fodor 1974; 1997; Kim 1992; see also Block 1997). Kim raises two key challenges 
to Fodor’s physicalist layered ontology, based on a causal inheritance principle, 
according to which realized property- instances inherit all their causal powers 
from their realizers. This principle entails that: (1) the causal powers of a realized 
property- instance are a subset of the powers of its realizer on that occasion.1 It 
follows that realized properties cannot bestow any causal powers their realiz-
ers do not, and on this basis Kim argues that they are causally redundant. Kim 
often assumes in addition that realized property- instances inherit all the causal 
powers of their realizers, so that: (2) the causal powers of a realized property- 
instance are identical to the powers of its realizer on that occasion.2 Kim argues 
that this renders special science properties not only causally redundant, but also 
as causally heterogeneous as their basic physical realization bases, and therefore 
unsuitable for framing laws.3
Defenders of the layered model typically accept the causal inheritance prin-
ciple, and argue that despite not bestowing novel powers, special science proper-
ties nonetheless exhibit enough causal novelty to be non- redundant, and enough 
causal unity to be nomic. According to the proper subset strategy, for instance, 
realized properties inherit their causal powers, but inherit only some of the pow-
ers of their realizers, which allows for both nomic unity and a limited form of 
1. This is how Kim (1998: 54) states the inheritance principle.
2. See for instance Kim (1993: 18).
3. Fodor (1997) disagrees that heterogeneity of the realization base precludes special science 
laws; Block (1997) offers support for Fodor on this point, arguing that where design or natural 
selection is at work, special science properties are projectible in relation to their selected effects 
despite differences in realization. These matters are beyond the scope of this paper.
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causal novelty (Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2001).4 Such strategies promise the kind 
of causal- explanatory novelty required for special science autonomy without 
novel causal powers, but whether or not they deliver is a matter of considerable 
controversy. What is uncontroversial is that physical realization rules out novel 
causal powers, so that the only way to defend the layered model is to give an 
account of the causal novelty of special science properties that is consistent with 
their having only inherited causal powers.
In this paper, I offer a groundwork for a physicalist form of emergentism 
about the special sciences, based on rejecting the causal inheritance principle, 
and according to which some realized properties bestow causal powers their 
realizers do not. I’ll refer to any property F whose bearers have at least one 
causal power in virtue of F, and no other property (except in cases where that 
property inherits F’s powers), as causally fundamental.5 I’ll use the term ‘basic 
physical’ for unrealized, independent causally fundamental properties such as 
electric charge. According to the orthodoxy sketched above, only basic physical 
properties are casually fundamental, since causal fundamentality for dependent 
properties precludes physical realization, and so requires the kind of mysterious 
brute determination endorsed by the British emergentists.6 My central aim here 
is to argue against this orthodoxy. I shall argue that the molecular geometry of 
H2O is a multiply realizable property that plays an irreducible role in explaining 
the dipole moment of the molecule, and that it thereby bestows causal powers its 
basic physical realizers do not. Through this, I aim to show that physical realiza-
tion is consistent with causal fundamentality, making room for a position on the 
special sciences that has all the important features of traditional emergentism— 
except the mystery.7
As we’ll see, the key to my proposal is the claim that at least some special sci-
ence properties are, in a sense to be clarified presently, qualitatively— as opposed 
to functionally— realized. Functional properties are causally individuated, and to 
instantiate one is to have its defining causal powers; correspondingly, to realize 
one is to bestow those powers. Functional realization in effect derives special sci-
ence properties from their realizers by means of derivative causal powers, and the 
4. Although Fodor doesn’t often talk in terms of causal powers, his (1997) model of special 
science autonomy is functionalist, and as Wilson (2015) argues, functionalism can plausibly be 
seen as a version of the proper subset strategy.
5. I do not claim that causal novelty is the only way for a property to secure fundamentality, 
hence my appeal to causal fundamentality as opposed to fundamentality simpliciter.
6. e.g., Alexander (1920), Morgan (1923), Broad (1925). It isn’t entirely clear that Alexander 
posits brute determination in order to explain causal novelty, but it is plausible; see Mclaughlin 
(1992: 66– 67).
7. Readers for whom brute determination is an essential component of emergence will need 
to find an alternative term for the position defended here. I’ll say more about the traditional role of 
brute determination in Sections 1– 2.
812 • David Yates
Ergo • vol. 3, no. 31 • 2016
causal inheritance principle is a natural consequence. By contrast, qualitatively 
realized properties are defined by non- causal specifications, and their realization 
is not a matter of bestowing the right causal powers. Properties such as molecu-
lar geometry are causally fundamental, I shall argue, because their bearers have 
certain causal powers in virtue of meeting their defining specifications, but not in 
virtue of the realizer properties in virtue of which they meet those specifications 
on a given occasion.
My talk of causal powers should not be mistaken for commitment to a pow-
ers ontology, in which basic physical properties are treated as individuated by the 
causal powers they bestow.8 I hold that things are thus- and- so empowered in 
virtue of their properties, where to be thus- and- so empowered is to be such as 
to enter into a characteristic range of causal interactions with other empowered 
particulars under certain circumstances. I leave open the nature and strength 
of the relation between basic physical properties and the powers they bestow, 
thereby remaining neutral as to whether any such properties are causally in-
dividuated. Powers so conceived manifest when the appropriate circumstances 
obtain, and their bearers behave in the appropriate ways; causation may then 
be seen as the coming together of empowered particulars, resulting in whatever 
their powers are powers to do. I’m also neutral as to whether empowered par-
ticulars may fail to manifest their powers when the relevant circumstances ob-
tain.9 The sense in which properties bestow causal powers is simply that they de-
termine, or contribute to determining, how their bearers are disposed to behave 
under a range of circumstances. A property that makes a novel contribution in 
this regard bestows a novel power.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, I give a more precise ac-
count of emergence in order to clarify what it is I aim to demystify. In Section 2, 
I distinguish functional from qualitative realization, and argue that geometric 
properties are multiply qualitatively realized by the basic physical properties 
of their bearers. In Section 3, I discuss the chemical explanation of the dipole 
moment of water, and argue that H2O molecules have certain causal powers in 
virtue of their molecular geometry; and in Section 4 I argue that they possess 
these powers solely in virtue of their molecular geometry. In Section 5 I consider 
an objection to the proposed model based on the prima facie transitivity of the ‘in 
virtue of’ relation invoked once between basic physics and molecular geometry, 
then again between molecular geometry and causal powers; and I conclude in 
8. Variants of such ontologies are defended in Shoemaker (1980), Heil (2003), Molnar (2003), 
and Bird (2007).
9. Mumford and Anjum (2011) argue that power manifestation isn’t metaphysically neces-
sary, because any power can be prevented from manifesting by the addition of further empowered 
particulars, whereas metaphysical necessitation is monotonic. Heil (2016) argues that these aren’t 
cases in which the original power fails to manifest, but ones in which a new network of powers 
manifests exactly as it must. I needn’t take sides here.
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Section 6 by considering the prospects for my emergentism as the ground of 
special science autonomy.
1. Emergence and Causal Novelty
Jessica Wilson’s distinction between strong and weak metaphysical emergence 
offers a useful framework within which to discuss dependent causal novelty 
(Wilson 2015: 353– 363; see also Wilson 1999; 2005; 2011).
Strong:   Token higher- level feature F is strongly metaphysically 
emergent from token lower- level feature P on a given occa-
sion iff: (i) F synchronically depends on P on that occasion; 
and (ii) F has at least one token power not identical with any 
token power of P on that occasion.
Weak:   Token higher- level feature F is weakly metaphysically emer-
gent from token lower- level feature P on a given occasion iff: 
(i) F synchronically depends on P on that occasion; and (ii) F 
has a non- empty proper subset of the token powers had by 
P on that occasion.
As they stand, these definitions aren’t quite what we need for present purposes. 
For one thing, Wilson speaks in terms of token properties having causal powers, 
whereas I prefer to speak in terms of properties bestowing powers. More seri-
ously, Wilson’s (Strong) might be taken to imply that the hardness of a diamond, 
for instance, is strongly emergent. Suppose one held, with Carl Gillett (2002), 
that hardness is not a property of the individual carbon atoms that make up a 
diamond, or of the tetrahedral lattice structures of those atoms when arranged 
diamond- wise. Rather, hardness is a property of particular diamonds. The hard-
ness of a diamond is realized by basic physical properties in the sense that the 
diamond possesses the powers definitive of hardness in virtue of the powers be-
stowed upon its constituent atoms by those properties (Gillett 2002: 318– 320). If 
this is correct, then it seems— at least on the assumption that property- instances 
literally have causal powers— that an instance of the property of being a dia-
mond will have several token powers, viz. those definitive of hardness, that are 
not identical to any token powers of its basic physical realizers. Because I’m 
sympathetic to Gillett’s theory of realization— I’ll adopt a modified version of it 
in Section 2— I need to reformulate Wilson’s distinction accordingly:10
10. The parenthetical clauses are for consistency with the account of realization adopted in 
Section 2. I leave ‘in virtue of’ as a primitive for now, but I’ll have more to say about it in Section 5.
814 • David Yates
Ergo • vol. 3, no. 31 • 2016
Strongʹ:   Token higher- level feature F of x is strongly metaphysically 
emergent from token lower- level features P1, . . . ,Pn of x (or 
its proper parts) on a given occasion iff: (i) F synchronically 
depends on P1, . . . ,Pn on that occasion; and (ii) x has at least 
one token power in virtue of F but not in virtue of P1, . . . ,Pn 
on that occasion.
Weakʹ:   Token higher- level feature F of x is weakly metaphysically 
emergent from token lower- level features P1, . . . ,Pn of x (or 
its proper parts) on a given occasion iff: (i) F synchronic-
ally depends on P1, . . . ,Pn on that occasion; and (ii) x has a 
non- empty proper subset of the powers it has in virtue of P1, 
. . . ,Pn in virtue of F on that occasion.
Given (Strongʹ), the hardness of a diamond is not strongly emergent, for it is 
clearly in virtue of its lattice structure that a diamond is hard.11 As far as I can 
tell, it’s universally agreed that strong emergence is not consistent with physi-
cal realization, and for that reason it’s not typical to appeal to it as an ordering 
relation in a layered ontology. Weak emergence, by contrast, is clearly consistent 
with physical realization, and offers an elegant way to rebut Kim’s argument 
that special science properties are causally heterogeneous. A weak emergentist 
can accept that F inherits its powers from its realizers, but deny that F inherits 
all of those powers, and can then account for F’s nomic unity by claiming that all 
instances of F bestow the same non- empty proper subset of the powers of their 
realizers.12
Whether weak emergence could underpin a robustly layered world, how-
ever, is moot. True, in bestowing only a proper subset of P1, . . . ,Pn’s powers, F 
does something that P1, . . . ,Pn cannot do; however, F also does something that 
P1, . . . ,Pn must do, viz. bestowing a proper subset of P1, . . . ,Pn’s powers. Weakly 
emergent properties may have novel causal profiles, but they don’t bestow novel 
powers. now according to received wisdom, physically realized properties are at 
most weakly emergent,13 so there’s a principled limit to their novelty. Against this 
backdrop, it’s all too easy for reductionists to argue that the while the world 
11. It may be that Wilson’s intention is that a token feature ‘has’ a given power only in the 
non- literal sense that it is an instance of a property in virtue of which its bearer literally has that 
power, in which case the hardness of a given diamond does come out as a power that its token 
realizers ‘have’ on that occasion. even so, it remains useful to reformulate the distinction so that 
this is explicit.
12. Wilson (2015) argues at length that all attempts to square special science autonomy with 
the physical realization of special science properties are (at least tacitly) forms of weak emergence. 
An apparent exception to this claim, which Wilson doesn’t discuss, is list and Menzies (2010), of 
which more in Section 4.
13. I’ll have more to say about the reasons for this consensus in Section 2.
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may be conceptually layered, it is ontologically flat. By contrast, strongly emer-
gent properties, qua causally fundamental, could without question underpin a 
robustly layered world, but only at the cost of giving up on physical realization, 
which is a price not worth paying. What the layered model arguably needs is 
strong emergence, but— so the familiar story goes— only weak emergence is on 
the table.
novel causal powers in the sense given by (Strongʹ) are not the only way of 
characterising strong emergence. Some say strongly emergent properties gener-
ate new forces in addition to those generated by their physical bases, or— if this 
is different— that they are governed by sui generis causal laws (Alexander 1920; 
Broad 1925); others that they have effects that are not additive sums of the effects 
of their base properties (Morgan 1923); and others that they exert a downward 
causal influence on the basic physical domain (Morgan 1923; Broad 1925; Sperry 
1975). It is also often said that strongly emergent properties are not deducible 
from basic physics— not even in principle— typically due to some prior meta-
physical theory, such as the ones just mentioned (Alexander 1920; Broad 1925). 
I shall argue in what follows that molecular geometry is strongly emergent ac-
cording to (Strongʹ), in such a way that: (a) it does not generate new forces, nor 
is it governed by sui generis causal laws; (b) its effects are not an additive sum of 
the effects of its basic physical realizers; (c) this is a case of downward causation; 
(d) despite being strongly emergent, molecular geometry is deducible from basic 
physics.14
2. Functional versus Qualitative Realization
Realized properties— unlike traditional strongly emergent properties— are deriv-
ative, in the following sense. Take the actual fundamental entities to be those that 
are necessary and sufficient for God to duplicate in order to create a duplicate 
simpliciter of our world. everything else— the derivative entities— (S)He gets for 
free.15 On this view, derivative properties are, in David Armstrong’s (1997: 12– 
13) words, a metaphysical free lunch, “no addition of being” compared to their 
realizers. Because they are derived from their realizers, it’s natural to suppose 
that the powers of realized properties must likewise be derived from the powers 
of their realizers. Intuitively, properties that have the kind of causal novelty de-
fined by (Strongʹ) can’t be derivative, hence can’t be realized. The main accounts 
of realization in the literature encode this intuitive constraint by defining the re-
alization relation in terms of derivative causal powers. Consider first accounts of 
14. I defend claims (a)- (d) at the end of Section 4.
15. For more on this characterisation of the derivative, see Barnes (2012).
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realization on which the realized property is construed as a second- order func-
tional property: F = the property of having some other property with causal role 
R; and P realizes F iff P fills R.16 This conception of realization is behind Kim’s 
commitment to the causal inheritance principle, according to which the powers 
of a given instance of F are inherited from its realizer on that occasion. Clearly, F 
can’t causally outstrip P, and is at most weakly emergent, depending on whether 
F inherits all of P’s causal powers, or just those relevant to filling R. If the latter, 
F is weakly emergent according to both (Weak) and (Weakʹ).
It isn’t just second- order functionalists who think that the causal powers of 
realized properties are derivative. Consider Gillett’s (2002; 2003) dimensioned 
theory of realization, according to which:
Property instance(s) P1, . . . ,Pn realize an instance of a property F, in an 
individual x, iff x has powers that are individuative of an instance of F in 
virtue of the powers contributed by P1, . . . ,Pn to x or x’s constituents, but 
not vice- versa.
In Gillett’s account, F is again construed as a causally individuated property, 
but not as a second- order property. The account is consistent with Kim’s caus-
al inheritance principle, but doesn’t require it, since Gillett holds that there are 
cases— such as the hardness of a diamond, discussed in Section 1— in which the 
powers that individuate F are not straightforwardly powers bestowed by P1, 
. . . ,Pn, because they are not instantiated by x’s basic physical constituents at all. 
This is what leads Gillett to deny that functional properties are second- order, for 
second- order properties and their first- order realizers, he argues, are instantiat-
ed in the same individual. On the dimensioned theory, however, it remains true 
that F’s causal powers are inherited from P1, . . . ,Pn in the weaker sense that any 
causal powers x has in virtue of F, it ultimately has in virtue of P1, . . . ,Pn. Once 
more, realized properties are at most weakly emergent, depending on whether x 
has any powers in virtue of P1, . . . ,Pn but not in virtue of F. If it does, then F will 
be weakly emergent according to (Weakʹ).
It isn’t just functionalists who treat realization in terms of derivative causal 
powers. Consider first Sydney Shoemaker’s version of the subset theory of real-
ization:
Property X realizes property y just in case the powers bestowed by y are 
a subset of the powers bestowed by X (and X is not a conjunctive prop-
erty having y as a conjunct). (2001: 78)
16. See Kim (1992) for more on this conception of realization, and its problems.
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It’s immediately clear that on this theory, y cannot be strongly emergent, for 
all its causal powers are bestowed by X. Whether y is weakly emergent or not 
emergent at all depends on which subset of X’s powers it bestows. This in turn 
depends on whether y is multiply realized, in which case its powers are a proper 
subset of X’s. In the light of Shoemaker’s (1980) causal theory of properties, it’s 
natural to interpret his theory of realization in terms of parthood: if we identify 
properties X and y with sets of powers, then X realizes y iff X is part of y.17 How-
ever, Shoemaker explicitly denies that his theory of realization depends on the 
causal theory of properties. Having originally proposed the subset account as a 
theory of realization specifically for functionalists, in which case y is treated as 
a functional property, he later recants, suggesting that the theory doesn’t even 
require Y to be causally individuated.18
On Wilson’s (1999; 2011; 2015) version of the subset theory, a multiply real-
ized property bestows a proper subset of the powers of its realizer, and is weak-
ly emergent according to (Weak).19 Strictly speaking, Wilson doesn’t offer the 
proper subset account as a theory of realization, but as a necessary and sufficient 
condition that theories of realization must meet if they are to be adequate to the 
needs of non- reductive physicalists. A theory of realization, for Wilson, delivers 
physically acceptable, irreducible realized properties iff that theory entails that 
the powers of a realized property- instance are a proper subset of the powers of 
its realizer on that occasion— whether or not the realized property is function-
al.20 On both Shoemaker’s and Wilson’s accounts, then, realization respects the 
causal inheritance principle, and realized properties are at most weakly emer-
gent. In Wilson’s case, weak emergence is taken as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a theory of realization to be suitable for framing non- reductive 
physicalism.
For my part, I think that both Shoemaker and Wilson are right to adopt ac-
counts of realization that don’t require realized properties to be causally indi-
viduated, but wrong to hold on to the causal inheritance principle. The inheri-
tance principle is a consequence of functionalism, according to which realized 
properties are individuated by causal roles and realizing them is a matter of 
filling those roles. To embrace it as a definition of or constraint upon realization 
while denying that special science properties are functional, however, is to throw 
out the baby but keep the bathwater. I agree with Wilson that weak emergence is 
17. If y is multiply realized, then of course X is a proper part of y.
18. Shoemaker claims that his theory of realization depends “only on the weaker thesis that 
each property is individuated by a causal profile in the sense that it and it alone has that profile in 
the actual world and worlds nomologically like it” (2007: 142).
19. Wilson explicitly treats realization in terms of (Weak) in her (2015).
20. See in particular Wilson (2011). Wilson is clear from the outset that her theory doesn’t re-
quire a commitment to functionalism, and points to this feature as an advantage over Shoemaker’s 
(2001) position.
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a sufficient condition for physical acceptability and accept that it offers a limited 
form of causal novelty.21 As I noted in Section 1, I doubt that weak emergence 
offers enough causal novelty to underpin a layered ontology, but I needn’t argue 
for that claim here. Instead, I’ll focus on establishing that weak emergence is 
not necessary for physical acceptability, because some realized properties bestow 
causal powers their realizers do not, and are thus strongly emergent.
extant accounts of realization have it in common that the causal powers of 
realized properties are inherited from their realizers. Because this constraint is 
definitive of functionalism, I’ll refer to such theories of realization as functional-
ist, whether or not they embrace the causal individuation of realized properties. 
Functional realization, broadly construed, consists in bestowing casual powers, 
and requires that the powers of the realized property are derived from those 
of its realizers. If functional realization were the only way of realizing special 
science properties, then strong emergentism about the special sciences would 
indeed preclude physical acceptability, and require us to embrace mysterious, 
brute inter- level determination relations with “natural piety” (Alexander 1920: 
46– 47). However, not all realized properties are functionally realized.
By way of illustration, let us consider the sphericality of material bodies. In 
Cartesian co- ordinates, we may define the property of being a sphere of radius 
R, centred at (x0,y0,z0), as the property of being an X such that all points (x,y,z) 
that lie at X’s outer boundary satisfy the formula: (x- x0)2+(y- y0)2+(z- z0)2=R2. Ac-
tual spheres are only approximately spherical, but that needn’t concern us here. 
Complex spherical bodies (more or less) satisfy the above formula in virtue of 
the properties and relations of their proper parts.22 To be spherical, bodies need 
proper parts with some intrinsic basic physical properties or other, but given 
suitable basic physical particulars, all we need to do to make a sphere of radius 
R is arrange them so that they compose a body that satisfies the formula. In gen-
eral, to have a geometric property is to satisfy a certain mathematical formula; 
and things that have the property in question satisfy the defining formula in 
virtue of the properties and relations of their basic physical proper parts.
I’ll describe the formulae that define geometric properties as specifications of 
those properties, but I don’t claim that all specifications are mathematical formu-
lae, or that all the properties they specify are geometric. now crucially, because 
sphericality has a non- causal specification, its realizers do not realize it by be-
stowing causal powers. I’ll refer to realized properties with non- causal specifica-
tions as qualitatively realized. We must be careful to distinguish properties such as 
21. I think this holds true whether we understand weak emergence in terms or (Weak) or 
(Weakʹ).
22. I treat sphericality as mathematically defined, but this is not to say that sphericality is an 
abstract or mathematical property. As I see it, sphericality is among those broadly physical proper-
ties whose essential natures can be described by means of abstract mathematical formulae.
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the electrostatic bonds that are responsible for the diachronic stability of a solid 
metal sphere’s shape, from the properties that synchronically realize its shape. 
While the former realize the rigidity of such a sphere by means of the causal 
powers they bestow, the latter realize its sphericality at a given time by being 
properties and relations in virtue of which it meets the relevant specification at 
that time. I adopt the following general account of realization:
Property instance(s) P1, . . . ,Pn realize a property- instance Fφ(x) iff (i) x or 
its proper parts possess P1, . . . ,Pn in some combination; and (ii) x meets 
the specification φ definitive of Fφ in virtue of (i), but not vice- versa.23
The above account allows for functional realization— simply let φ be a causal 
role specification and Fφ be a property individuated by that role. However, for 
full generality we may allow φ to be any proposition that is the specification a 
realizable property.24 The account is broad enough to allow that not only the dis-
positional properties of diamonds, but also their geometric shapes, are realized 
by their basic physical properties and relations. Geometric properties are also 
multiply realized in basic physics. Spheres can be made of wood, iron, glass, steel, 
water, light; the proper parts of a given sphere need not be of the same kind; and 
there are many possible distinct sphere- wise arrangements of the same proper 
parts. Readers familiar with lawrence Shapiro’s views on realization may how-
ever be inclined to doubt this:
Steel and aluminium are not different realizations of a waiter’s corkscrew 
because, relative to the properties that make them suitable for removing 
corks, they are identical. (2000: 644)
Shapiro’s idea is that both the steel and aluminium corkscrews are composed 
of rigid metal parts of the same shape and structure, all of which are broadly 
physical properties, and at this level of specification the property of being a cork-
screw is uniformly realized in each case. However, the different basic physical 
properties of the metals that compose each corkscrew are the properties that 
ultimately realize the dispositional and geometric properties in virtue of which 
each mechanism functions as a corkscrew, for instance rigidity, shape, and struc-
ture. The corkscrews are identical “relative to the properties that make them 
suitable for removing corks” only if we focus solely on properties such as the 
23. This account owes much to Gillett’s, discussed above.
24. note that Melnyk (2003) endorses an account of realization that allows for non- causally 
individuated properties to be realized, but doesn’t draw anything like the conclusions from that 
view that I do. I make no attempt at demarcating propositions that do, from those that do not, 
specify realizable properties.
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rigidity or shape of the components, or the structure of the mechanism, abstract-
ing away from the differences in their realization.25 It is unduly restrictive to 
insist that the two corkscrews are uniform realizations of the waiter’s corkscrew 
simply because their components have the same shapes, or because they have 
the same mechanistic structure. In any case, the kind of variability in realization 
that obtains between the two corkscrews is all I claim for qualitatively realized 
properties.
Functionally realized properties, as we’ve seen, are at most weakly emer-
gent, but qualitatively realized properties don’t share this principled limitation. 
The reason for this is that the bearer of a qualitatively realized property can have 
certain causal powers: (i) in virtue of meeting the defining specification, but (ii) 
not in virtue of basic physical properties and relations in virtue of which it meets 
that specification. It follows that qualitative realization is consistent with strong 
emergence as defined in (Strongʹ). That makes qualitatively realized properties 
much better candidates for securing the autonomy of the special sciences than 
their functionally realized counterparts. Qualitative realization has the resources 
to demystify emergence, I shall argue, because it makes it possible for dependent 
properties to be causally fundamental without the need for brute determination.
Before proceeding, let me pause to distinguish the current project from a 
recent demystification attempt due to elizabeth Barnes (2012).26 Barnes defends 
a meta- ontological framework in which every entity is either absolutely fun-
damental or derivative, and nothing is both. Barnes’s proposal is that we can 
demystify emergence by interpreting it as the claim that there are dependent 
fundamental entities. What is novel in Barnes’s approach is the idea that many 
of the problems with emergentism stem from trying to make sense of it within 
a layered ontology in which the levels are ordered by relative fundamentality, 
with the bottom level— basic physics— alone qualifying as absolutely fundamen-
tal. On this model, given that basic physical entities fully compose all others, 
strong emergence requires downward causation from less fundamental higher 
level properties to the absolutely fundamental physical domain, and this in turn 
raises doubts about the coherence of strong emergence.
Barnes suggests that strong emergentists’ problems with downward cau-
sation stem from the natural supposition that all causal relations can be fully 
explained in terms of the absolutely fundamental. If basic physics alone is ab-
solutely fundamental, then it seems it ought to be causally closed, but strong 
emergence violates the causal closure of basic physics. In Barnes’s alternative 
framework, the commitment is not to the causal closure of the basic physical, but 
25. Similar points are made in Gillett (2003).
26. I lack the space to do full justice to Barnes’s paper, and focus solely on her claim that mak-
ing certain meta- ontological moves suffices to demystify the causal novelty of strongly emergent 
properties.
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to the causal closure of the fundamental, which may include strongly emergent 
non- basic properties. On the assumption that all genuinely causally novel enti-
ties are fundamental, the causal closure of the fundamental is a priori, because 
the class of fundamental entities is bound to include a minimally sufficient basis 
for explaining everything that happens. In a layered ontology, as Barnes sees it, 
emergent properties are less fundamental than basic physical properties, despite 
having just the same kind of causal novelty. On Barnes’s view, dependent caus-
ally fundamental properties and basic physical properties are equifundamental.
Does this suffice to demystify emergence? yes and no. In Broad’s emer-
gentism, for instance, emergent properties such as the chemical bond are both 
dependent and causally novel, thereby violating the causal closure of the basic 
physical. This is reflected in Wilson’s (Strong) and my (Strongʹ), which character-
ize strong emergence in terms of dependent properties with new causal powers, 
which entails that they are both dependent and fundamental, assuming causal 
fundamentality is sufficient for fundamentality simpliciter. If demystifying emer-
gence were as simple as allowing for causally fundamental dependent prop-
erties, and hence rejecting the causal closure of the basic physical, then there 
wouldn’t be anything mysterious about Broad’s emergentism. However, Broad 
needed special trans- ordinal laws to ground the dependence of emergent prop-
erties on basic physics, and their novel powers, which is in itself mysterious.
In sum, my demystification project takes off where Barnes’s ends: she holds 
that the key to emergence is causally fundamental dependent properties, which 
in turn requires us to abandon the idea that the basic level is causally closed, and 
I agree. Indeed, the position I shall argue for in this paper violates the causal 
closure of basic physics.27 However, while there is no room in Barnes’s meta- 
ontological framework to question how dependent properties could be caus-
ally fundamental given the causal closure of basic physics, there’s plenty of room 
to question how they could be causally fundamental at all. As I said, according 
to Barnes nothing can be both fundamental and derivative; realized properties 
could not therefore be causally fundamental, on her account. That places her 
squarely in the tradition discussed above, according to which derivative proper-
ties have derivative causal powers. If she were defending emergentism of the 
kind she takes her meta- ontology to demystify, Barnes would presumably need 
to posit special emergence laws or brute dependency relations of some kind, just 
as Broad did, and that seems to me to take us back into the realm of the mysteri-
ous. In any case, my strategy here will be to argue that derivative properties can, 
after all, be causally fundamental— provided they are qualitatively, rather than 
functionally, realized.
27. I’ll return to this issue in Section 4.
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3. The Causal Relevance of Molecular Geometry
It’s uncontroversial that molecules possess causal powers in virtue of their mo-
lecular structure. A case in point is the dipole moment of H2O, which is respon-
sible, inter alia, for hydrogen bonding in water, which in turn is responsible for 
water being a liquid at room temperature and 1atm pressure. The dipole mo-
ment itself is explained in terms of the geometry of the H2O molecule, which is 
therefore causally relevant. What is less clear, and hitherto unappreciated, is that 
molecular geometry cannot be eliminated, even in principle, from the explana-
tion. I’ll get to that in Section 4; in this section, my purpose is to clarify the role 
of molecular geometry in explaining the dipole moment of H2O, and the causal 
powers it bestows as a result.
Water molecules are composed of two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded 
to a single oxygen atom. In each of these covalent bonds one of the O atom’s 
six valence electrons is shared with the H atom’s lone electron. The O atom in 
an O- H bond attracts these electrons more than the H atom, due to its greater 
electronegativity— the O atom has eight positively charged protons, while each 
H atom has just one. each of the two bonds is therefore polar, in that each is more 
negative to towards the O end. This polarity is modelled as the separation of 
two partial charges, δ+ and δ- , separated by a distance B, the O- H bond length. 
The separation of two equal and opposite charges of magnitude δ results in a 
dipole moment μOH, which is a vector quantity whose magnitude is given by 
μOH = δB, directed by convention from δ+ to δ- . now in an H2O molecule, there 
are also two lone pairs of valence electrons not used up in covalent bond forma-
tion. We can predict the bond angles in the H2O molecule by using the valence 
shell electron- pair repulsion (VSePR) model. The idea is to treat the bonds and 
lone pairs as located on the surface of a sphere centred on the central atom, and 
assume that they will try to get as far away from each other as possible due to 
mutual repulsion between the electron pairs in the bonds and the lone pairs. We 
add the number of atoms bonded to the central atom to the number of its lone 
pairs, to get the steric number of the molecule. The H2O molecule has a steric 
number of 4, which yields a predicted bond angle of 109.5°. The four elements 
form a tetrahedron, with the O atom at the centre and the two H atoms and two 
lone pairs at the vertices. The molecule has a tetrahedral electron pair geometry. 
The measured value is approximately 104.5° because the lone pairs repel more 
strongly than the pairs used in covalent bond formation. The molecular geometry 
of H2O is bent, as seen in the following diagram:
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We can now deduce that the water molecule itself is polar, because of the 
non- linear arrangement of the two polar O- H bonds. The dipole moment of H2O is 
a measure of how much the two bond dipoles point in the same direction, and is 
responsible for properties such as hydrogen bonding and the alignment of H2O 
molecules in an electric field. The resultant dipole moment μres of the H2O mol-
ecule is the vector product of the two equal O- H bond dipoles μOH:
Where θ is the angle between the two O- H bonds. Here μres is the sum of the 
components of the two O- H bond dipoles that point in the same direction, and 
hence do not cancel out, due to the non- linearity of the H2O molecule. If θ were 
180°, the dipole moment would be zero, since cos(90°)=0. like H2O, CO2 contains 
two polar bonds, but unlike H2O, the central C atom has no lone pairs, resulting 
in a linear molecule in which two equal and oppositely directed bond dipoles 
cancel out. For present purposes, the point of interest is that the bond angle 
plays a crucial role in determining μres. As we vary the bond angle θ between 
Figure 1
2 cos
2res OH
θ
µ µ
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0° and 180°, the factor by which we multiply the bond dipole vectors to get the 
resultant varies between 1 and 0.28
Molecular geometry is a qualitatively realized property, and the tripartite 
bent geometry of H2O is realized by the basic physical structure of the molecule. 
The property that features in the above explanation is the qualitatively realized 
property, not its basic physical realizer. While the O- H bond lengths play a role 
in determining the O- H bond dipoles, the specific distance relations between 
the atoms play no further role in the explanation of the dipole moment of H2O 
except insofar as they represent one way to have a tripartite bent geometry with 
a bend of 104.5°. According to the equation just given for the resultant dipole 
moment, its value depends only on the O- H bond dipoles and the angle between 
the bonds. let G be the property of being composed of three proper parts x, y 
and z, arranged such that z is equidistant from x and y, and straight lines drawn 
between x and z and y and z subtend an angle of 104.5°. Highly diverse physical 
structures can have G— not only H2O molecules but also molecular models, for 
instance— in many different ways and for many different reasons. To instantiate 
G is to be an X that meets a mathematical specification in virtue of the properties 
and relations of its proper parts. While there are (of course) causal explanations 
of how such an X’s proper parts get to be so structured as to instantiate G, and— 
at least in the case of H2O— why their realization of G is diachronically stable, G 
is qualitatively, not functionally, realized.
now the reader may well suspect at this point that it’s the basic physical 
structure of the molecule, rather than its qualitatively realized geometry, that’s 
really doing the causal work in relation to the dipole moment, with geometry no 
more than a useful explanatory proxy. I take up the challenge of arguing against 
this intuitive position in the next section. For now, I merely wish to highlight the 
role that G plays in explaining the dipole moment of H2O, and the causal pow-
ers it bestows through this role, leaving open whether it inherits these powers 
from its realizers. In general, a body’s shape determines the range of possible 
ways in which a quantitative basic physical property such as electric charge can 
be distributed over it. One way for charge to be distributed over bearers of G is 
such that it is concentrated towards the central component z, relative to x and 
y, which is bound to yield a resultant dipole moment, as the x- z and y- z dipoles 
won’t fully cancel out. The various forces at work in the H2O molecule result in a 
charge distribution that gives rise to two O- H bond dipoles. Given that H2O has 
a bent molecular geometry, this results in a molecule with a non- zero net dipole 
moment, as the two vectors share components in the same direction. Holding 
everything else fixed, we can imagine varying the bond angle θ between 0° and 
28. The O- H bond dipoles are of magnitude 1.5D, where 1D = 3.34x10- 30Cm. Using these val-
ues in the above equation, the magnitude of the resultant dipole moment of H2O is 1.84D. In 
practice, the bond dipoles are calculated from a measured value for the dipole moment of H2O.
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180°, resulting in a net dipole moment μres that varies between 2μOH and 0, with 
the cosine of θ/2.
H2O molecules have a range of powers in virtue of their dipole moments, 
such as the power to align in an electric field. Microwave ovens rely on this 
power to heat food, subjecting it to an oscillating electric field that accelerates its 
constituent H2O molecules as they flip their orientation to match the orientation 
of the field, thereby increasing the temperature of the food. Because G plays a 
role in determining the dipole moment of H2O, it thereby plays a role in deter-
mining that H2O molecules have this power. Because many other properties are 
involved, it’s natural to say that G bestows conditional powers, in Shoemaker’s 
sense, upon H2O (2001: 25– 26). For X to have a power simpliciter is for it to be dis-
posed to behave in a certain way, when appropriately related to certain stimuli. 
For X to have a conditional power is for it to be such that if it had certain other 
properties, it would have the relevant power simpliciter, where the other proper-
ties in question are not independently sufficient for this. necessarily, every X 
such that G(X), has (inter alia) the power to align in an electric field, conditionally 
on (1) X’s being such that its proper parts x, y and z are bonded together so that 
G(X) is stable under an electric field, and (2) z being negatively charged rela-
tive to x and y. We have already seen above how the H2O molecule meets these 
conditions, but there are many other ways. A molecular model with G might 
meet them by being composed of three charged conducting spheres connected 
by conducting metal rods, suspended so as to allow sufficient degrees of rota-
tional freedom to align (or else in free fall), and being such that the z sphere is 
more electronegative than both x and y. let us label this conditional power ‘ψ’.
In addition to the powers simpliciter that it undoubtedly bestows, electric 
charge also bestows conditional powers: the power to align in an electric field 
conditionally on being an X with G, being bonded so that X’s geometry is stable 
under an electric field, and being such that z is negatively charged relative to x 
and y, for instance. The difference between this conditional power and ψ high-
lights the different roles that molecular geometry and charge play in determining 
how the H2O molecule is disposed, by dint of their different roles in determining 
its dipole moment. As Shoemaker notes (2001: 25), conditional powers enable us 
to isolate the causal contributions of individual properties to a power simpliciter 
when— as is commonplace— that power is jointly bestowed by several proper-
ties. To bestow a conditional power upon X is to be one of several properties 
that jointly determine how X is disposed to behave under certain circumstances. 
I have argued in this section that G partially determines the dipole moment of 
H2O, and thereby bestows conditional power ψ upon H2O molecules, which is to 
say that G plays a specific role in determining that H2O molecules are disposed 
to align in an electric field.
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4. The Causal Fundamentality of Molecular Geometry
In this section I argue that H2O molecules do not have ψ in virtue of their basic 
physical properties, and that G is therefore a strongly emergent property accord-
ing to (Strongʹ), for it bestows a causal power that its realizers do not. To clarify 
my position, I’ll first contrast it with Hilary Putnam’s views on the causal role 
of shape, and his associated alternative proposal concerning the autonomy of 
psychology. Putnam compares functionally realized psychological properties to 
geometric properties, and argues by analogy that despite the fact that they don’t 
bestow novel powers, such properties nonetheless have a kind of explanatory 
novelty that suffices for the autonomy of psychology (1975: 130– 132). Putnam 
asks us to consider a board with a round hole, and a square peg that doesn’t 
fit through it. Putnam grants that this fact is deducible from basic physics, but 
argues that the deduction doesn’t count as a good explanation. The geometric 
explanation is fully general, applying to objects of the same shape regardless of 
how their shapes are realized, whereas the basic physical deduction works only 
for things that are physically like the peg and board— things whose shapes are 
realized in just the same way. Here, as Putnam sees it, we have a case of the ex-
planatory novelty of shape despite the fact that all the causal powers of the peg 
and board are bestowed by their basic physical properties.
A plausible interpretation of Putnam’s peg case is that the geometric expla-
nation is a program explanation. On any given occasion, a token failure of the 
square peg to fit through the round hole can be fully causally explained in terms 
of the basic physical properties of the peg and board. The shapes of the peg 
and board, however, make certain that whenever we try to fit the square peg 
through the round hole, some basic physical process will be operative such that 
some parts of the peg and board collide resulting in a failure to fit. What we are 
attempting to do is impossible, given the shapes of the peg and board, so there’s 
bound to be some token physical process that prevents us from doing it on any 
given occasion. The program explanation thus applies across all possible realiza-
tions of the same shapes, and thereby conveys modal information that particular 
process explanations lack (Jackson & Pettit 1990).29
On certain modal theories of causation, this kind of modal novelty entails 
causal novelty. Christian list and Peter Menzies (2010) argue from modal nov-
elty to causal novelty on this basis, concluding that special science properties are 
strongly emergent, at least according to Wilson’s (Strong).30 Given a difference- 
making account of causation, a realized property- instance can cause some effect 
29. See Baron and Colyvan (2016) for full discussion of program explanation as applied to 
Putnam’s peg and board case, and for intriguing connections between it (and other, similar cases 
of non- causal mathematical explanation) and lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox.
30. note that list and Menzies do not characterize their position as a form of emergence.
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its realizer does not.31 Roughly, according to such accounts, F causes G iff (i) F 
occurs □ → G occurs, and (ii) ¬(F occurs) □ → ¬(G occurs). now take a realized 
mental property instance M, its physical realizer P, and a behavioural property 
instance B caused by M. If we suppose that the causal relationship between M 
and B is realizer- invariant, in that B occurs at the nearest M- worlds that are not 
P- worlds (i.e., the nearest worlds where M is differently realized), then P isn’t a 
difference- making cause of B. The reason is that not- P worlds where M occurs 
are closer to actuality than not- P worlds where M doesn’t occur, and at such 
worlds, B occurs just the same, so it’s false that had P not occurred, B would not 
have occurred. list and Menzies assume that difference- making causes manifest 
the power to cause their effects and conclude that M has a power— viz. the power 
to cause B— that P lacks, which renders M emergent according to (Strong).
now whether M is strongly emergent according to (Strongʹ) depends on 
whether M has its modal properties in virtue of its realizer P. Since P by hypoth-
esis lacks these modal properties, M can’t inherit them directly from P. We might 
say that M is causally individuated, and hence gets its modal profile from its 
causal powers, which are in turn inherited from P, but that seems to get things 
backwards: on the difference- making theory, causal powers are explained in 
terms of the modal profiles of property- instances, not vice- versa. It’s not at all 
clear to me where token events and physical objects get their de re modal proper-
ties, or indeed whether they have de re modal properties at all, but such matters 
are beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice it to say that if M doesn’t have 
its modal profile in virtue of P, then given difference making causation, and once 
again assuming that difference- making causes manifest the power to cause their 
effects, it follows that M is strongly emergent according to (Strongʹ) as well.
Problematically, because P is a sufficient cause of B’s realizer Pʹ, there is 
surely some causal- explanatory relationship between P and B, even if it’s not 
(difference- making) causation.32 If we think of B as a modally fragile event essen-
tially realized by Pʹ, then B has a complete non- psychological cause P. It’s only 
if we think of B as a modally robust event that spans a neighbourhood of close 
possible worlds that we need a similarly robust event, M, as its cause. In effect, 
P causes the particular realization Pʹ of B that happens at our world, with M tak-
ing up the modal slack of causing occurrences of B at nearby worlds where P is 
absent. Those sceptical of the ascription of de re modal properties to token events 
may suspect that the problem with the basic physical explanation of B in terms 
of P is not that P fails to cause B, but that the causal explanation of B in terms of P 
fails to apply to relevantly similar actual cases, in which other individuals have 
an M- instance that causes a B- instance, but fail to have either P or Pʹ. Opponents 
31. This is the central message of yablo (1992).
32. Cf. yablo (1992: 274), where he distinguishes causation proper, construed in difference- 
making terms, from causal sufficiency, which holds between P and B.
828 • David Yates
Ergo • vol. 3, no. 31 • 2016
of a layered model supported by difference- making causation can now argue 
that it mistakes facts about our explanatory practices for facts about the causal 
structure of the world. That the basic physical causes of certain phenomena seem 
too specific shows only that when it comes to explaining those phenomena, we 
often value the explanatory generality provided by program explanations.
I’m happy to grant that geometric explanations such as that found in Put-
nam’s peg case are program explanations. Rather than appeal to modal consid-
erations to argue that molecular geometry is causally fundamental, I shall in-
stead argue that it plays a unique and ineliminable role in the process explanation 
of any token alignment of H2O molecules in an electric field. Molecular geom-
etry does not merely program for whatever basic physical properties genuinely 
cause such alignments on some occasion, nor does its causal- explanatory value 
consist solely in generality. I shall argue in the remainder of this section that the 
dipole moment of H2O cannot be explained without appealing to the geometry G 
of the molecule, which is to say that it has no purely basic physical explanation. 
There’s no question of G being a mere program explainer of a token alignment of 
H2O molecules in an electric field, for it plays a unique role in determining that 
they have the power simpliciter to so align.
The structure of the argument is as follows: (i) G plays a role, alongside basic 
physical properties, in determining the dipole moment of the H2O molecule; (ii) 
H2O molecules have a range of powers in virtue of their dipole moments, such as 
the power to align in an electric field; (iii) because G plays a partial role in deter-
mining the dipole moment of H2O, G bestows corresponding conditional pow-
ers such as ψ upon it; (iv) if G inherits ψ from its basic physical realizers, then we 
can explain the dipole moment of H2O without appealing to G; however, (v) we 
cannot explain the dipole moment of H2O without appealing to G. Conclusion: G 
does not inherit ψ from its basic physical realizers, and is strongly emergent ac-
cording to (Strongʹ). I argued for premises (i)– (iii) in Section 3. Premise (v) bears 
the central argumentative burden, but let me first offer some remarks in support 
of premise (iv). It’s important to bear in mind that G bestows ψ upon H2O by 
dint of its role in determining the dipole moment of the molecule. To say that 
G inherits ψ from its basic physical realizers is therefore to say that these latter 
must really do what G does in determining the dipole moment, which, as we’ve 
seen, is to determine the extent to which the O- H bond dipoles point in the same 
direction. now if G’s basic physical realizers occupy G’s role in determining the 
dipole moment, it follows that we should be able to explain the dipole moment 
by appealing to those properties in place of G. Hence, if G inherits ψ from its re-
alizers, we can explain the dipole moment without appealing to G. Conversely, 
if we can’t explain the dipole moment without appealing to G, then it and it 
alone bestows ψ.
let’s turn now to premise (v). Because its dipole moment is a property of the 
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H2O molecule, it’s appropriate to cast the question of whether it has a purely ba-
sic physical explanation in terms of whether it can be deduced from basic physical 
properties and laws, without appealing to the geometry of the molecule. If it can 
be so deduced, then the dipole moment has a wholly basic physical explana-
tion, and G’s conditional powers are inherited. I needn’t endorse a deductive- 
nomological account of explanation in general; the point is rather that deduc-
ibility is the appropriate explanatory model in the present case. I shall argue 
that while the dipole moment of H2O can be deduced from basic physics, the 
deduction cannot proceed without appealing to G. Because G is qualitatively 
realized, G itself can be deduced from the basic physical properties of H2O. 
From this, however, it doesn’t follow that the dipole moment of H2O has a com-
plete basic physical explanation. What follows is that a crucial component of the 
explanation— G— has a complete basic physical explanation. Having deduced G 
from the basic physical properties of the H2O molecule, we can then only deduce 
the dipole moment by appealing to basic physics and G together.
Proponents of the causal inheritance principle will think that G inherits its 
conditional powers from the specific spatial structure formed by the three con-
stituent atoms of H2O— from the basic physical properties and relations that re-
alize G in the H2O molecule. let the O- H bond length be B; it’s easy to show that 
the distance D between the two H atoms is given by:
Where θ is the bond angle, 104.5°. It follows that D=1.58B. We can now specify 
how G is realized in H2O: G is realized by two H atoms each a distance B from a 
single O atom, and 1.58B from each other. Being so constituted is one of count-
less ways for a tripartite structure to have a bent geometry with a bend of 104.5°. 
If, in the explanation of the dipole moment of H2O, G is merely a proxy for these 
specific distance relations, we should be able to deduce the dipole moment by re-
placing G with the relations in question. Consider the set of basic physical prop-
erties of the H2O molecule other than the distance relations between the atoms— 
the charge of the electrons, the electronegativity of the atoms, and so forth. Our 
question is: can we deduce the dipole moment of H2O by adding only the specific 
distance relations to this set of properties? The reader may find it more natural to 
think in terms of the structural property formed by combining all the basic physi-
cal properties and relations of the molecule, but this adds nothing of explana-
tory significance. If we can’t explain the dipole moment of H2O by appealing to 
its basic physical properties and relations, then expressing those properties and 
relations by means of a single complex predicate won’t help. How should the 
explanation proceed? The obvious option is to use the distance relations to draw 
a diagram of the molecule:
2
2
D Bsin θ =   
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Drawing the molecule to scale allows us to see that it’s non- linear, hence that the 
resultant dipole can’t be zero; it also allows us to measure the bond angle, and 
calculate the dipole moment based on the equation given in Section 3. However, 
this is simply to use the basic physical relations to determine the molecule’s ge-
ometry, and then appeal to its geometry to deduce the dipole moment. That, it 
goes without saying, is not to deduce the dipole moment without appealing to 
G. Suppose it’s now objected that we can see that the molecule is polar without 
drawing it, simply by reflection on its basic physical properties and relations. 
Given that the O- H bonds are polar, the molecule will be polar if it is also non- 
linear. now it must be non- linear, for if it were linear, then D=2B. Given that 
D<2B, the molecule must be bent, hence must have a non- zero resultant dipole. 
Once more, however, we have simply appealed to the basic physical proper-
ties of the molecule to determine that the bond angle θ<180°. While this isn’t 
the same property as G, it’s still a multiply realizable geometric property; and 
what’s more, it doesn’t enable us the deduce magnitude of the dipole. If we want 
to do that, we need to know the degree of non- linearity, for which we need to 
know the bond angle.
Perhaps we can do better. each O- H bond dipole, you will recall from Sec-
tion 3, is given by μOH=δB, and directed from the relatively positive H atoms to 
the relatively negative O atom. We can resolve each of the two O- H bond dipoles 
into component vectors at right- angles. The left- hand dipole is shown below, 
resolved into x and y components:
Figure 2
Figure 3
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The component (μOH)x is cancelled out by an equal and opposite component 
of the right- hand dipole, with (μOH)y the component that isn’t cancelled, and 
2(μOH)y the magnitude of the resultant μres. The relative magnitudes of the three 
vectors above are represented by the relative lengths of the corresponding sides 
of the triangle. Crucially, the vectors form a similar triangle to that formed by 
each half of the molecule, so the ratio y:B in the molecule is equal to the ratio 
(μOH)y:(μOH) of the magnitudes of the vectors:
Rearranging, we can see that the magnitude of (μOH)y is equal to the fraction 
y/B of μOH:
We can now appeal to the basic physical properties we know to calculate the 
value of y/B. We divide the molecule into two right- angle triangles, as in the dia-
gram, so that x=(D/2)=0.79B. We can calculate the value of y in terms of B, using 
Pythagoras’ theorem: B2=y2+(0.79B)2, giving a value of y=0.61B. Hence y/B=0.61, 
and (μOH)y=0.61μOH. It follows that μres=1.22μOH. We know that μOH=1.5D,33 hence 
μres=1.84D. Alternatively, we can substitute μOH=δB in the previous equation, in 
which case (y/B)μOH=δy. We know the value of the charge difference δ, and we 
can calculate the value of y as above, given that we know the value of B.
Haven’t we now deduced the dipole moment of H2O by appealing to G’s 
realizers, the spatial relations between the atoms, in place of G? First, even if we 
grant that the above deduction makes no appeal to G, it’s clearly not a wholly 
non- geometric explanation, as it assumes we can we divide the molecule into 
two right- angle triangles, which in turn depends on mirror symmetry in the 
plane of the molecule. Second, the deduction does appeal to G: we didn’t just 
appeal to basic distance relations, but to ratios of such relations, and the ratios 
in question are geometric. We first assumed that the two triangles were similar, 
which is to assume that their internal angles are the same. It’s because the angle 
between y and B is equal to the angle between (μOH)y and μOH that the ratios of 
y:B and (μOH)y:μOH are the same— as will no doubt be familiar, they are both 
equal to cos(θ/2). Recall our equation of Section 3 for μres:
33. See Footnote 28.
( )OH y
OH
y
B
µ
µ
=
( )OH y OH
y
B
µ µ
 
=   
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In this equation, cos(θ/2) gives the extent to which the two O- H bond dipoles 
point in the same direction. All that our putatively non- geometric derivation 
achieves is to show that there’s another way of calculating that extent to which 
these two dipoles point in the same direction. We can substitute cos(θ/2) with 
y/B, which gives us the following alternative equation:
But the ratio y/B gives the extent to which the two dipoles point in the same 
direction precisely because it encodes the angle between them. As y/B tends to 
zero, so the molecule tends towards linearity and the resultant dipole moment 
μres of the molecule tends to zero; the closer its value is to unity, the greater the 
resultant. This isn’t to deduce the resultant dipole moment without appealing to 
G, but to appeal to G under an alternative mode of presentation.
If we attempt to deduce the dipole moment of H2O from basic physics with-
out appealing to molecular geometry, we draw a blank, for no sooner have we 
started the deduction than we find ourselves deducing that H2O has G as an es-
sential intermediary step. I conclude that molecular geometry plays a unique 
role in determining the dipole moment of H2O, and in virtue of this bestows 
a conditional power ψ that it doesn’t inherit from its basic physical realizers. 
Assuming that (Strongʹ) is the right way to characterize strong emergence, and 
that conditional powers are within its scope, then given that G is a dependent 
property, it is also strongly emergent. let me remind the reader of some claims 
I made in Section 1: (a) G does not generate new forces, nor is it governed by 
sui generis causal laws; (b) G’s effects are not an additive sum of the effects of 
its basic physical realizers; (c) G’s role in determining the dispositions of water 
molecules is a case of downward causation; (d) G is deducible from basic phys-
ics. We are now in a position to understand why these claims are true, and how 
they are consistent.
(a) In determining the range of possible ways charge can be distributed over 
its bearers, G clearly doesn’t exert a force on the charge- bearing electrons. It’s the 
various forces acting on the electrons combined with the shape of a given charge 
bearer that determine its charge distribution. While the electrons are attracted to 
the H and O atoms that compose the molecule by Coulomb forces, the shape of the 
resulting charge cloud depends not only on the magnitude of those forces, but also 
on the shape of the molecule. In particular, it’s the degree of non- linearity, speci-
fied by G, that determines the extent to which the O- H bond dipoles don’t cancel 
each other out. Molecular geometry exerts no forces, but not all the causal pow-
2res OH
y
B
µ µ
 
=   
2 cos
2res OH
θ
µ µ
 
=   
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ers that properties bestow are powers to exert forces, because there’s far more to 
causation than just doing physical work. We don’t need sui generis laws to explain 
what G does precisely because its causal powers are not powers to exert forces; G 
partially determines the dipole moment of H2O solely by being the property it is. 
Once we have its mathematical specification to hand, nothing further is needed to 
explain why it bestows the conditional powers that it does.
(b) The effects of functional properties are additive sums of the effects of 
their realizers. let’s say that rigidity bestows the power to maintain shape under 
a force. Suppose a force is applied to a body X on some occasion, and the bonds 
between X’s basic physical parts absorb the supplied energy without breaking. 
This preserves the spatial relations between X’s proper parts, ensuring that its 
shape stays constant under the force. Any token effect of X’s rigidity is identi-
cal to the combined effects of its basic physical realizers, and that’s as it should 
be, because rigidity is functionally realized. Functional properties inherit their 
powers from their realizers, so it’s no surprise that what they cause reduces to 
what their realizers cause; that’s what functional realization is. By contrast, the 
effect of molecular geometry in a token alignment of an H2O molecule in an 
electric field is not an additive sum of the effects of its realizers, although it’s 
impossible to isolate a token effect of which G alone is the cause. Remember that 
G bestows a specific, novel conditional power to align in an electric field, which 
is to say that it’s one of several properties that jointly bestow the corresponding 
power simpliciter. A token alignment of an H2O molecule in an electric field is the 
combined effect of all these properties acting together. It’s difficult to see how to 
divide up such an effect between the contributing properties, but I think it clear 
that because G’s role in determining the dipole moment of H2O is not occupied 
by its basic physical realizers, its contribution to a token alignment is not an ad-
ditive sum of theirs.
(c) To bestow a conditional power upon X is to partially determine how X is 
disposed to behave. Because G plays a novel role in determining how H2O mol-
ecules are disposed to behave, and H2O molecules are composed of basic physi-
cal particulars, G’s effects are a case downward causation. My position therefore 
violates at least one causal closure principle. According to a standard formula-
tion of the closure principle, all physical effects are fully caused (or have their 
chances determined) by purely physical prior histories (Papineau 2002: 17– 18).34 
If we take ‘physical’ to mean basic physical, then the physical is not causally 
closed, because some properties that play a novel role in determining what goes 
on there aren’t basic physical properties. However, physicalists typically don’t 
interpret ‘physical’ in this way. Rather, they think that ‘physical’ means broadly 
34. The precise formulation is unimportant for present purposes. For more on why closure 
principles must stipulate that physical effects have full or complete physical causes, see yates (2009).
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physical, and refers to anything that is either basic physical, or stands in some 
appropriate relation to basic physical entities.35 Provided qualitative realization is 
an appropriate relation, the causal closure of the broadly physical is safe. I think 
it clear that broad physicality is closed under qualitative realization, but even if 
it weren’t, the causal fundamentality of molecular geometry would refute the 
causal closure of the broadly physical, and not vice- versa.
(d) I grant that we can deduce that H2O has G from the basic physical proper-
ties and relations of its constituent atoms. Readers familiar with the longstand-
ing tradition of contrasting emergence with deducibility will no doubt find it 
surprising that a deducible property could be causally fundamental, but on re-
flection, it should be no more surprising than the central thesis of this paper— 
that strong emergence is consistent with physical realization. The mere fact that 
a qualitatively realized property is deducible from basic physics doesn’t suf-
fice to show that its causal powers are inherited. To show that G inherits its 
conditional powers from its basic physical realizers, we would need to deduce 
the dipole moment of H2O from its basic physical properties without appealing 
to G— and this, I have argued, cannot be done. We can only deduce the dipole 
moment of H2O by appealing both to basic physical properties and laws and its 
geometry. Given that ‘x is deducible from y’ expresses a transitive relation, it fol-
lows that the dipole moment of H2O is likewise deducible from basic physics.36 
In the deduction, however, G is an essential intermediate step, which is just what 
we would expect if G were both causally fundamental and deducible. These de-
ducibility relations exactly reflect the metaphysical structure for which I have 
argued: H2O has G in virtue of its basic physical properties, but it has its dipole 
moment in virtue of its basic physical properties and G, with G playing a crucial 
role in determining the resultant of the two O- H bond dipoles.
At this point, however, a problem arises. I appeal to ‘in virtue of’ relations 
twice here: once in the realization relation between the basic physical properties 
of H2O and G, and again between G and conditional powers such as ψ, which re-
flect G’s putatively unique role in determining how H2O molecules are disposed. 
But if ‘in virtue of’ is transitive, then H2O has ψ in virtue of its basic physical 
properties, precluding G’s causal fundamentality.
5. The Grounding Objection
Following Kit Fine (2002: Section 1), let us suppose that metaphysical grounding 
is an explanatory relation holding between facts: the fact that A grounds the fact 
35. See for instance Crook and Gillett (2001).
36. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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that B iff the fact that B obtains in virtue of the fact that A, and it is metaphysi-
cally necessary that if A then B.37 I hold that the H2O molecule’s geometry is 
qualitatively realized by its basic physical properties, and qualitative realization 
seems a clear case of metaphysical grounding. It’s in virtue of its basic physical 
properties and relations that H2O meets the specification that defines G, and 
it’s metaphysically necessary that anything having those properties meets that 
specification. I argued in Sections 3– 4 that it’s solely in virtue of meeting the qual-
itative specification that defines G that H2O has ψ. However, because ψ is a con-
ditional power, it’s metaphysically necessary that G- bearers have ψ. It follows 
that the fact that H2O has ψ is grounded in the fact that it has G. If grounding is 
transitive, then the fact that H2O has ψ is grounded in its basic physical proper-
ties, in which case H2O has ψ in virtue of its basic physical properties, and G is 
not strongly emergent.
My response to the grounding objection doesn’t depend on denying the tran-
sitivity of grounding. Instead, I shall argue that the basic physical grounding 
of ψ is consistent with G’s being strongly emergent. The basic physical proper-
ties that realize H2O’s molecular geometry are those in virtue of which it meets 
a mathematical specification; and in virtue of meeting that specification, H2O 
has ψ. These are two quite distinct grounding relations, but this crucial fact is 
obscured by focusing on their shared abstract properties. Following Wilson 
(2014), I distinguish this abstract grounding relation from specific grounding 
relations such as realization by labelling the former ‘Grounding’ (with a capital 
‘g’), and shall argue that Grounding is too coarse- grained to capture the meta-
physical structure of my emergentist proposal, which requires two distinct little-
 g grounding relations. Basic physics mediately grounds ψ via one grounding 
relation— qualitative realization— between basic physics and molecular geom-
etry, and a distinct grounding relation— causal power bestowal— between G and 
ψ. That these relations are both instances of Grounding does not entail that ψ is 
really bestowed by the H2O molecule’s basic physical properties. let me explain.
I accept that there’s a sense in which H2O has ψ in virtue of its basic physical 
properties. Must I not therefore retract the central claim of this paper, viz. that 
H2O has ψ solely in virtue of G? no— but I do need to disambiguate the various 
‘in virtue of’ claims involved. let us write the qualitative realization relation 
between H2O’s basic physical properties and G as follows:
1) H2O has G in- virtue- ofQR its basic physical properties
37. Here ‘in virtue of’ is a sui generis relation appropriate to claims of metaphysical explana-
tion. The relation is hyperintensional: the fact that Socrates exists grounds the fact that {Socrates} 
exists, but not vice versa, despite the fact that necessarily, Socrates exists iff {Socrates} exists. 
Grounding is therefore not amenable to reductive modal analysis.
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now let us write the causal power bestowal relation between H2O’s geometry 
and ψ as follows:
2) H2O has ψ in- virtue- ofCP its having G
The ‘in- virtue- ofCP’ relation is whatever relation holds between a property and 
its bearers when that property plays a role in determining how they are disposed 
to behave, and I leave open that there may be distinct such relations depending 
on the types of properties concerned. The step from (1) and (2) to the claim that 
ψ is Grounded in basic physics cannot be based on the transitive closure of the 
specific ‘in virtue of’ relations expressed in (1) and (2), because they are different 
relations. Still, it is plausible that the conjunction of (1) and (2) entails that there 
is some ‘in virtue of’ relation between H2O’s having its basic physical properties 
and its having ψ, and that this relation underpins an instance of the Grounding 
relation discussed above. To avoid begging the question concerning the nature 
of this relation, let’s write it as follows:
3) H2O has ψ in- virtue- ofGR its basic physical properties
When I say that H2O has ψ solely in virtue of G, I mean that it’s solely in- virtue- 
ofCP its having G that H2O has ψ. The fact that it’s in- virtue- ofGR its basic physical 
properties that H2O has ψ refutes this claim if, and only if, this instance of ‘in- 
virtue- ofGR’ is also an instance of ‘in- virtue- ofCP’. If G were functionally realized, 
we would have independent reason to say that (3) expressed an instance of ‘in- 
virtue- ofCP’. As we’ve seen, functional properties are at most weakly emergent, 
so any conditional powers H2O has in- virtue- ofCP its functional properties are 
indeed powers it has in- virtue- ofCP its basic physical properties.38 However, G is 
not functionally realized, so this line of argument doesn’t work. It’s difficult to 
see what else one could say in favour of the claim that (3) expresses an ‘in- virtue- 
ofCP’ relation.
Furthermore, there are good reasons to deny that (3) expresses an instance of 
38. In yates (2012), I argue that despite not bestowing novel powers, functional properties can 
still do novel causal work in the sense that the functional properties of components ground the 
causal powers of complex mechanisms from a unique distance in a grounding hierarchy extending 
from basic physics upwards. However, it’s functional realization all the way up, on the account 
proposed, so all the causal powers of mechanisms are ultimately bestowed by the basic physical 
properties of their components. I defend a layered ontology in yates (2012) only insofar as I offer 
a rebuttal of the causal exclusion argument against it, according to which functional properties 
should be eliminated because there’s no causal work for them to do within such an ontology. Assum-
ing a layered model ordered by functional realization, I reply that functional properties get to be 
causally novel within it by means of the layer they occupy. In the present work, by contrast, I offer 
positive arguments for the layered model.
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‘in- virtue- ofCP’. let’s remind ourselves what is at stake. To claim that the H2O mol-
ecule’s basic physical properties do not bestow ψ upon it amounts to denying that 
they are wholly causally responsible for its being disposed to align in an electric 
field. If H2O’s basic physical properties were wholly responsible for this fact, then 
we would expect to find a purely basic physical explanation thereof. However, as I 
argued in Section 4, no such explanation is possible. By contrast, it’s easy to explain 
why H2O molecules are so disposed if we appeal to their geometry together with 
their basic physical properties, which is exactly what we would expect if the meta-
physical structure of the situation were as I have described it.
In sum, there’s no reason to think that (3) expresses a causal power bestowal 
relation, and every reason to think that it doesn’t. Wilson argues that the claim 
that the mental is Grounded in the physical leaves open a range of specific mental- 
physical relations— functional realization and type identity, for instance— and 
that Grounding is therefore of no use in understanding the mind- brain relation-
ship. For that, we need to know which specific relation obtains (Wilson 2014).39 
If I am correct, then the claim that all causal powers are Grounded in basic phys-
ics leaves open whether any dependent properties are causally fundamental. I 
don’t take this to show that Grounding is of no theoretical use, but it’s certainly 
a failure to capture metaphysical structure.
6. Conclusion
Brian Mclaughlin (1992) argues that the decline of British emergentism was due 
to the explanation of the chemical bond in quantum mechanical terms. What had 
seemed, to Broad, to be special chemical forces holding atoms together turned 
out to be an artefact of the incompleteness of the physics of the day. Mclaughlin 
may be right about Broad, but that’s no reason to give up on emergentism as a 
model for the autonomy of chemistry. The qualitative realization of geometric 
properties allows molecules to have their molecular geometry in virtue of their 
basic physical properties, as Mclaughlin contends, and yet to have certain caus-
al powers solely in virtue of that geometry (when ‘in virtue of’ is appropriately 
disambiguated, as discussed in Section 5). I have argued in this paper that the 
H2O molecule has certain conditional powers solely in virtue of its geometry, 
because geometry plays a unique and irreducible role in determining its dipole 
moment. Molecular geometry is both dependent and causally fundamental, and 
that’s what it is for a property to be strongly emergent.
39. Wilson also argues that not being Grounded in basic physics fails to distinguish tradition-
al strong emergentism with brute determination, in which the emergent properties are dependent 
upon physical base properties, from versions of property dualism that posit no such dependency 
on the physical.
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The reader may worry that my arguments lack broad enough application 
to explain the autonomy of the special sciences in full generality. I have argued 
only that the geometry of the H2O molecule plays a crucial role in explain-
ing its dispositions. How does that extend to other special sciences? Molecular 
geometry can be seen as a kind of spatial pattern— the pattern atoms make in 
three dimensional space, when combined into molecules. The special sciences 
are replete with pattern- like properties, and not all such properties are spa-
tial. For example, in neuroscience, temporal patterns are highly important. It 
has been suggested that neuronal coherence— synchronous oscillation in the 
sub- threshold membrane potential— increases the efficiency of neuronal com-
munication (Fries 2005). In short, this is because the sub- threshold membrane 
potential represents the excitability of a neuron, so synchronously oscillating 
neurons share excitability peaks. This in turn means that provided the travel 
time of an action potential is significantly less than the period of oscillation, 
neurons in synchronously oscillating populations are most sensitive to inputs 
from neighbouring neurons just when those neurons are most likely to send 
action potentials.40 It’s not the specific oscillation rates that are doing the ex-
planatory work here, but the pattern of phase- locked oscillation between them, 
and that is a multiply realizable temporal pattern akin to molecular geome-
try.41 neuronal coherence is plausibly another case of a causally fundamental 
qualitatively realized property.
According to received wisdom, physical realization precludes strong emer-
gence. Only spooky emergent properties get to be both dependent on basic 
physics and causally fundamental, and all else being equal, we shouldn’t believe 
in those. Qualitative realization makes room for causally fundamental depen-
dent properties without the mystery of traditional emergentism. The price of a 
robustly layered ontology is not physical acceptability, but functional realization. 
I don’t deny that some special science properties are functionally realized, but I 
doubt that weakly emergent properties are causally novel enough to secure the 
autonomy of the special sciences. At least some special science properties, how-
ever, are qualitatively realized, and at least some such properties are strongly 
emergent. The theory developed here extends in a natural way to special sci-
40. It has also been suggested that synchronous oscillation might explain how the brain ac-
complishes feature binding across different sensory modalities, and there is a huge literature on 
this issue. I appeal to the potential role of phase- locking in explaining inter- neuronal communica-
tion here because it seems to me a clearer case of the potential causal novelty of temporal patterns 
in cognitive neuroscience, and because the temporal binding hypothesis is hugely controversial. 
See Shadlen and Movshon (1999), and the other papers in the same issue.
41. Here is Fries: “I hypothesize that [effective neuronal communication] is mechanistically 
implemented by the pattern of coherence among neuronal groups, that is, the pattern of phase- 
locking among oscillations in the communicating neuronal groups” (2005: 474).
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ences such as biology and neuroscience in which the patterns realized are at least 
as important as the basic physical properties that realize them.42
Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, dependent yet causally fundamental 
properties don’t require the mysterious brute laws or special forces that led to 
the decline of traditional strong emergentism as an account of the autonomy of 
the special sciences. The idea that such things are required to secure new powers 
is a symptom of the dominant functionalist account of physical realization, ac-
cording to which weak emergence is an upper bound on the causal novelty of re-
alized properties. Broadly speaking, special sciences study the causal powers of 
complex arrangements of physical particulars; what more natural way for them 
to secure autonomy than by virtue of the fact that when it comes to causality, the 
pattern of the arrangement is just as important as what is arranged?
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